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AB3TMC?
The purpose of this study m  to investigate asymptotic bo* 
fcavlar and the ”gttgfe&er*s fallacy to a non~contingeni binary pro**- 
diction task in. children of various ages and-adults* . A total of 
158 subjects were tested* All .subjects-were adnlidstered the mam 
task, and the result© for the various age group© were compared*
The result© indicated that asymptotic behavior a© well a© the 
occurrence of the ^ gndblar9© fallacy11 differ according to age* The 
proportion of protoability^ natchers increased with increasing age 
while the proportion of maximisers and undesvisatchers decreased*
The differences between group© were significant'* While the children 
held# the seventh grade did not exhibit the ^ gambler*© fallacy 
seventh^grader© Mid. college student© showed a clear negative recency 
effect# Thus, age was found to be an important variable in binary 
prediction behavior #
The implication© of the result© for theoretical assumptions in. 
regard to the ontogenetic development of response strategies in a 
probabilistic situation were noted#
vil
SEQUENTIAL BINARY PREDICTION IN CHILDREN 
AND ADULTS
imnmmnm
wf^b&billtyf‘ i© an Integral part of every-day life* Express- 
lorn such as **X bet that***,” ‘’Chances are***,1’ tsThere Is a slight 
possibility that*#*,” all express varying degrees of certainty that 
an event will or will not occur* ’’Although fm adults would be able 
to define probability with any precision, and, in fact, definitions 
of probability are a natter of dispute among logicians and mathema­
ticians, most adults are able to behave effectively in probabilistic 
situations involving: quantitative proportions of Independent elements* 
Young children (too) are able to behave in terms of the probability 
concept under appropriate conditions.” (Yost, Siegel, & Andrews, 
•1962, p* 769}# The latter part of the above statement is based on 
a series of experiments by these authors which clearly contradicts 
Piaget’s notion that young children have no concept of .probability 
at all* Piaget placed, tokens of two different colors and unequal 
numbers in an opaque bag, while placing an identical assortment in 
a row on a table in front of §* || then was asked which color he 
would be moat likely to choose if he reached into the bag without 
looking* Five- to seven-year-old Ss used subjective criteria for 
their choices while eight- to 11-year-old Ss took into account- the 
actual proportions of the tokens and the changing probabilities 
when tokens were drawn without replacement. Yost, -Siegel, & Andrews
(1962) objected to the heavy reliance upon verbal, skills and modi­
3fied the task accordingly*
totem (1938* p* 5) pointed out that the concept of probability 
should be considered in learning studies t "In other words, it was 
no God-given rule but apparently some Rarely human predilection on 
otir part which made us heretofore tend almost invariably to make 
one- of the alternative behaviors always rewarded -and the other always 
punished* But other frequencies of reward, and pinishmeni are equally 
possible and equally deserving of study** folman then went on to 
say that Brunswick was one of the first learning theorists to recog­
nise the importance of this* Be emphasised that learning processes 
should be studied under conditions more nearly approximating every* 
day life situations, where a specific response to a specific stimulus 
class has a .probability of generally less than 1*00 of being re* 
warded* In his now classic study Brunswick (1939) used the above 
paradigm, i.e* he used varying probabilities including 1*00# with 
rats as experimental animals* At about the same time Humphreys 
(1939)#- using human subjects* studied "verbal expectations*w i*e* 
guesses as to whether or not an event would occur* Although Humph­
reys conceived of this study as a demonstration of pure "expectancy” 
uncomplicated by the effect of m  unconditioned stimulus (such as 
an air puff) it Is In many respects comparable to Brunswick*® work* 
Thus it seems fair to say that early studies in probability learning 
were undertaken out of m  interest in differentially rewarded en*
Avironmental m m ♦ This typo of study Is closely related to research
on partial reinforcement (Jenkins & Stanley, 1950}*
Estes (1964* p* 89) poised out that it is not clear Esther
or not probability learning can 'be considered a distinct type of
learning or must be subsumed under other categories* "like many
other Hypes* of learning," Estes says, "probability learning is
easier to identify than to define*" It has received its share of
attention and has been studied in terms of ambiguity of environmental
cues (Brunswick, 1939, 3impson & Voss, 1961), information theory
(Hake & Hyman, 1933)# an Ideally simple situation reflating the
problem-solving process (Goldman & Denny, 19631 Weir, 1963), game
theory and the decision-making process (Siegel, 1964} Siegel & Gold**
.stein, 1959), teste for' mathematical learning models (Anderson# I960!
Edwards, 1956} Estes, 1950,1964} Estes & Straughn, 1951), the effect
of previous experience upon reward expectancy (Goodnow & Bsttigrew,
1955} Eassen & Keessn, 1961} Btmmmm & tfeir, 1959), the subject's
reaction to a completely random occurrence of events (Berenhausa
& Merman, 1964), and, finally, in terms of an interesting learning
situation in its mm right with emphasis on strategies and sequential 
dependencies (Anderson, I960} Anderson & Whalen, I960} Craig &
%era, 1963} Berks, 1962} Edwards, 1956} Feldman, 1959} Goodnow,
1955} Jarvik, 1951} lindman & Edwards, 1961} loss & levy, 1958,
Weir, 1963)*
5the pBM'Bdim for probability eKjwgftoentd can he- described a© 
fallows* n0n each of a aerie© of trial©, J| Bakes a choice from an 
experimenter defined set of alternative responses, verbal or other, 
then receive© from g, a signal as to whether the choice was correct* 
In the usual non-contingent case each response ha© a fixed probabi­
lity of being rewarded (indicated a© correct) on my trial, regard-', 
less of H* 0 present or past choice©** (Estes, 1964, p* 91)# Although 
there have been exceptions, (Siegel, 1964f Stevenson & Odom, 1964| 
Weir, 1963) cliaracteristically two alternative choice© have been 
employed, the eosMned probability of the two event© ©imping to 1*00* 
The presentation and type of stimuli used have been varied and rang­
ed from sat© of cards bearing different ©yn&Qls (Darks, 19631 
ICessen & fesaon, 1961s fcieeslck & SoUey, 195?) end token delivery 
(Goodnow 4 Pettigrew, 1955| Stevenson & Weir, 1959?
Weir, 1963) to the prediction of flashing light© (Anderson, 1960s 
Darks, 1962| Kicks, 1959).
Interest ha© centered in the §p* asymptotic behavior, i*e. 
the response level after learning should have occurred* The re­
sults have been equivocal* A© Estes (1964) and Siegel (1964) point­
ed out, the definition as to what constitutes asymptotic behavior 
1© by no means dear# Various percentage© of the total number of 
trial© have been ©elected by different experimenter© on an empirical 
basis as representative of such behavior* The hatching hypothesis1’
6(originally proposed by Grant, Horoseth, & Hake, 1951} has found 
ample support in the literature* hatching is defined as a corre* 
spondence between gs* response probabilities and the actual overall 
probability of occurrence of the alternate events* This phenomenon 
has also been called "stable state behavior" (Siegel, 1964) # It 
was initially found by Humphreys (1939)® Similar evidence was re* 
ported by Anderson & Whalen (I960), Goodnow & Bostman (1955)# and 
Hake & Hyman, (1953)* It was «jtudL8$ extensively by Bush & Hosteller 
(1955) and by Estes (1964) whose mathematical models predict match* 
ing specifically* However Ss* final response level has also been 
found to overshoot the actual probability of the more often reward* 
ed event and tend toward a probability of 1*00* This behavior has 
been called 1%axi©islns,t* "pure strategy, ** (Siegel, 1964) or "©»* 
trmm asymptote generalisation" (Edwards, 1961)* These results 
seem to contradict the matching hypothesis* However a wealth of 
empirical studies points to a number of variables affecting behavior 
in a probability learning' situation and favoring one strategy or 
the other* When different parameters are taken into account, the 
contradiction is largely resolved*
The number of trials involved seems to have an effect# Few 
studies using more than 300 trials have been reported* Edwards 
(1961) who ran his subjects for 1000 trials, reported an increased 
tendency to maximise* Thor© is little evidence so far for or a&ainst
7this finding, although Berks (1962) explained it in terms of differ** 
ential run length acquisition* It is interesting to note in this 
context that monkeys go from maximissing to matching a® trials in­
crease (Wilson, Oscar, & Mttensan, 1964)*
The distribution of probabilities for the two alternatives 
(often designated as ^  , and dL ) seems to have a clear-cut effect* 
As the probability for the most frequently rewarded event ^  ap­
proaches 1*00, the tendency to choose that event increases (Edwards, 
1956$ Edwards, 1961$ Woods, 1959)* It should be noted here that 
cUscriminability of the two alternatives also increases with differ­
ences in their actual probabilities* Discrimiimtion thresholds have 
been found to lie around 60$4Q for adults (Simpson & Voss, 1961) 
and for older children (Ilesaick & Soiley, 1957) and are clearly 
established at least around 75s2$ distributions for cockroaches 
(bongo, 1964), fish (Behraid & Miterman, 1961), pigeons (Bullock 
& Bitterman, 1962), rats (Brunswick, 1939), monkeys (Wilson, Oscar,
& Bittorman, 1964), and younger children (Messiek & Solley, 1957)#
It was further noted by Simpson & Voss (1961) that Ss tended to
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overestimate event frequencies of high values of 11 and under­
estimate them with low values of t* %
Previous experience has been hypothesised to have an effect 
upon children*® learning strategies and asymptotic response levels* 
Stevenson k Zigler (1956) found that feeble-minded children tended
to maximise more than normal children, presumably because the normal 
children were less accustomed to accept low probabilities, of reward 
and thus developed more variable behavior in an attempt to find a 
*go-0df solution* Similar reasoning was' employed fey Stevenson &
Weir (1959) where young children were found to maximiase, and older 
children showed more variability resulting in reduced choice of the 
more- frequently rewarded ©vent* Jones It Xdverant (I960.) also ob­
tained comparable results but explained them differently* Older 
children were supposed to 'be more'familiar with reward probabilities 
of less than 1*00, hence should match, while younger children, be­
ing more naive, should naadtadsft* Kessiek & Solley (1957) obtained 
contradictory results which might have been -due to the absence of 
any tangible reward*
The number of alternatives- also enters as a variable* If for 
example %  is defined fey one response (such as choosing a blue 
card) and- K^. is defined fey several' responses (such as choosing 
either a yellow, orange or a white card) them is a tendency to 
maximise* This tendency becomes stronger when the number of response
r\j
alternatives for 1 x. increases* (Gardner, 195&I Hubinstein, 195f| 
Siegel, 1964).
The set with which £ enters a task m  mil as the presentation 
of the task and instructions also influence probability learning* 
When § assumes or is led to believe that a series is truly random
9(Estes* 1964; Peterson & UXchla, 1965; Hublnstoin, 1959} or that he 
faces a f gambling* situation (i#e# feds that his chances of learns 
Ing to be correct on ©very trial are minimi) he tends to maximise 
(Qoodnow, 1955) * When* on the other hand* § approaches the situation 
ms a problem solving task or- is explicitly told so* he tends to 
match (Goodnow, 19551 Goodnow & Postman* 1955) or reduces his choice 
of the more frequent event (Weir* 1963)* 'Such instructions seem to 
have little effect on younger children, however (ifeir, 1962), fin­
structions to verbalise hypotheses when information about the task 
is held to a minimum showed that there m  little correlation between 
these hypotheses and. the actual behavior (Stevenson & Weir, 1963)#
Variations In the intertrial interval produce no or minimal 
effects* {Anderson, I960; -Perks, 1962)* Tot if 8 is pushed to make 
a response with a. latency of ■ less than *5 seconds, matching results 
(Berks, 1962),
One. of the most important and possibly clear-cut variables 
affecting probability learning is the reward or risk contingent 
upon S*s response* tfaxlml&lng is most pronounced when there is a 
loss involved for the less frequent choice and a reward for the more 
frequent one* The tendency is still strong when, there is a reward 
contingent upon the correct choice .{Berks,-1962; -!%ers, Hats, Fort,
& Suyda®, 1963; Siegel, 1964f Siegel & Goldstein, 1959)# Further­
more, as the amount-of reward is increased, the tendency become#
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stronger {Atkinson, Sommsr, & SUraan, I960; Edwards, 1956; Siegel & 
Andrews, 1962), Das & Banda (1963), in contrast, found tlmt a candy 
reward for children acted m  a distractor and resulted in lower 
performance* Btmemon & Weir (1959) also found more variability 
the hi#ier the reward, but it imst be remembered that these authors 
used a three-choice situation, I3essick & Solley (195?) found that 
higher rewards were effective only for older children* It must 
further be noted that reward and the subjective utility of getting 
the infrequent event correct can interact (Siegel, 1964)# When § 
is achievement-oriented and wants to be right as often as possible, 
he may foe willing to take a risk; his reward then.results trm the 
feeling of being correct# He may also be trying' to relieve boredom 
and thus tend to choose the less frequent event, BrackbiH, Kapjy,
& Starr, (1962) -also found that children ^ discovered two games 
(i.e# getting the reward mgi catching the less frequent event) where 
the experjjssnter .intended om#” It has also been pointed out that 
a higher reward for the less frequent event may compensate for the 
proportionally more frequent occurrence of the other event (Atkin­
son, Sommer, & Sternum, I960; Edwards, 1956-)#
It is evident that asymptotic behavior reflected as matching 
or maximizdng is Influenced by a number of variables# The number 
of trials, the proportions of %  and , previous experience
XI
and age* the number of alternatives, the presentation of the task, 
the response latency* the amount of reward or risk contingent upon 
soaking a choice* and the subjective utility involved for || in a choice 
.have; been mentioned a© important parameters* differing results 
can often be reconciled when these variable© are taken into account, 
it must b© emphasised that the above list is by no means exhaustive. 
The systematic study of parameters in probability learning Is still 
going on and might reveal additional factors.
While many investigators were mainly concerned with asymptotic 
behavior (Estes* 1964; Grant, Boraeetb & Hake, X951| Humpreys, 1939; 
Siegel* 1964) many others realised that the averaging of results 
and asymptotic response levels per so by no means told the complete 
story and that more molecular learning processes and strategies 
m m  obscured. A systematic study of sequential dependencies and 
response patterns to event runs was undertaken by many authors 
(Anderson, 1960$ Anderson k Whalen* 1960$ Berks* 1962, 1963;
Feldman* 19591 Weir, 1963, etc#)# As early m  1939# Brunswick points 
ed out that although his animals seemed to respond* in the long 
run* to the overall distribution of frequencies ♦recency effects* * 
i.e. responses to individual trials or series of trials should be 
taken into account. However, he did not statistically evaluate such 
effects# Results of other studies suggest that £s respond as much 
if not more to short sequencos of events than they do to the overall
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probability proportions (Dorks, 1962f Edwards, 1956 s Hake & Hyman# 
1953)* Hake & Hyman (1953# P* 73# 74) put it this ways «#.♦ gp 
can make a particular response a given proportion of the time with* 
out being aware that they are responding according to any statistical 
rule* 3s do not act**# like statistically governed mechanism at 
all* The statistical characteristics of the responses are only by­
products of the stlinttltts-respana© relation m  have suggested**#
He (S) does not perceive an apparently random series as being honso- 
geneously random, but responds instead as thou# the series were 
composed of small sub-sequences, some of which are dependable cues 
to the future behavior of the series *•• Some sequences of previous 
events, especially homogeneous series of a correctly predicted sym­
bol, where shown to fee more adequate stimuli than were other©*”
A phexiomenon of special interest emerged when investigators 
directed their attention to sub-sequences* Generally referred to as 
"negative recency,” it has also been called the "gamblerfe fallacy" 
(Jarvik, 1951) or "maturity of chances" (Hoss k Levy, 1958)* nega­
tive recency refers to tho fact that with m  Increase of the number 
of consecutive, tassdi&tely preceding occurrences of a given event 
tho likelihood that S wtH predict this event decreases* Intuitive­
ly such a response pattern makos sens©* As darvik (1951# p* 296) 
explained its "Thus# in daily life a negative recency effect similar 
to tho one observed hare manifests itself in the anticipation# e»*
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htbited .hy the average person in coin-tossing or in predicting the 
awe of the next in a series of children* Hence the colloquial tern 
the *gambler*s fallacy* may be applied in our case#** Edwards (1961) 
similarly stated that if a flipped coin comes up heads eight or 
nine times in a row, S is likely to decide that tails is ’due* and 
so predicts or bets on it on the next toss*
Edwards also emphasised that the gambler’s fallacy is important 
because it flatly contradicts most learning models conceived in terms 
of the c^onditioning, axiom11 which in fact assert© that it does not 
occur# The conditioning axiom, predicting positive recency, states 
that "the greater the number of consecutive, immediately preceding 
occurrences of a given event, the more likely it is that & should 
predict that event on the next trial*1 (Estes, 1964, p* 93)# Estes 
argued that a complete, satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon 
is still lacking and dismissed it by saying that ♦*♦ ftthe negative 
recency function results largely from response tendencies Ss bring, 
to an experiment via generalizations from other situations but which 
extinguish with experience in the experimental situation.” Edwards 
(1961), unable to find unequivocal recency effects, called it % n  
evanescent phenomenon,” yet he conceded that when it does occur it 
denotes a highly Intellectual response because S must have some idea 
of what probabilities are and also must to some degree keep track 
of several preceding outcomes in order to exhibit it.
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So far, this gambler*a fallacy has not beta found to he clearly 
apparent before the- age of 15 (Boss § levy, 1958). furthermore it 
has never been found in animals. Animals seem to respond in terms 
of positive recency as demonstrated with cockroaches (longs, 1964), 
fish (Behrend & Bittermn, 1962), pigeons (Bullock & Bittensan,
1962), and rats (Brunswick, 1939)* Overall fit Brown (1959) compared 
rats and humans directly* They used the same probability schedule 
for both and found that although both eventually matched, tri&l~to»> 
trial changes were quit© different for the two species* Monkey© 
originally tend to respond according to the positive recency principle, 
but over very long series of trials they begin to use more sophist!** 
c&ted strategies than lower animals# If not exhibiting negative 
recency, they do seem sensitive to short-range variation© characterise 
tic of various schedule© (Wilson, Oscar, & Bittensan, 1964)*
Although Edwards (1961) and Feldman (1959) obtained weak or 
negative results in regard to the gambler*© fallacy, other invest!** 
gators demonstrated it quite clearly* Wicks (1959) found that re** 
©pons© curves for series of like runs rose after the first two oe- 
mmt&mm of such m  event and then, leveled, off at six or ©even 
occurrences* Berks♦ (1962) results are essentially in agreement 
with this finding as well, as Hos© & levyfs (1958) curves for adults* 
Tenth-graders showed flatter curves, dropping off somewhat later* 
Atkinson, Sommer, & Sterman (I960) reported an earlier peak for 
tei>y©ar*eXds*
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Findings such as the gambler* a fallacy suggest that it is not 
sufficient to describe the probability learning task in tanas of 
event proportions for the different alternatives and lengths of 
trial series alone# Kicks (1959) was mm of the first to emphasise 
the importance of describing sequences in terns of the number and 
lengths of runs# According to this author such an approach has 
several esqperimental and conceptual advantages i
1# Higher^order as well as first-order probabilities 
are described#
2* the overall sequence is described, as well as any 
given segment .
3* §& themselves seem to view a sequence of binary events 
in terms of runs, rather than an overall sequence
made up of individual events#
This method also makes it easier to compare results over experiments 
and to discover reasons for various discrepant findings# Variables 
affecting the occurrence and shape of negative recency curve© have 
been identified in this manner# Jarvik {1951) referred to i^ncident** 
a! serial accumulations of * check* {alternative 1) and ’plus* (al­
ternative 2) reinforcements in homogeneous runs,” the effect of 
which he investigated *after the fact* so to speak# Micks (1959) 
emphasized the effects of various schedules upon negative recency.
For example a randomly generated 505 50 sequence would not be conducive 
to negative recency, alternation being the usual resulting pattern#
As the probability of on© alternative assumes values greater than
16
ff *»#50, however, incidental accumulations for the mere often occurring 
event become increasingly likely# (Of coarse as If approaches 
1*00 there Kill be a * ceiling effect,* positive recency becoming 
more and more compelling especially as the series is extended*) 
Intermediate schedules like those used by Jarvik (1951) should yield 
the fbestf results with regard to the gambler1© fallacy* Comparing 
a 50t50 random schedule to 67*33 and 75*25 schedules, Hicks (1759) 
found that the latter indeed encouraged the fallacy* However, when 
a 50*50 schedule was restricted in that longer event rum were in­
corporated, similar effects were obtained# The lengths of rum 
emerge a© the important variable rather than the proportion of events 
in a schedule per se* To test this assumption specifically Berks
(1963) generated three types of 75*25 schedules# One contained 
mainly short rum, one long runs, and one extra long rum# While 
the short run schedule resulted in negative recency throughout 300 
trials, the other two schedules did so during the first 100 trials, 
but Ss quickly adjusted to the longer rum and showed positive re#* 
eency in the last 200 trials#
It is difficult to determine where in a series the gambler1© 
fallacy appears if it does appear* If, as Estes (1964) suggested, 
it is largely due to a weetn with which £ enters the situation, it 
should.occur at the beginning of a series# It seems to take some 
time, however, for Ss to exhibit it, since in moat studies it has
17
been found that they respond for a period at the chance (50s 50) 
level. It is difficult to compare data because of the great vari- 
at ion in number of trials employed. Whereas Eoss & levy (1953) 
used only 40* Eduards (1961) and Dorks (1962) used up to 1000* Boss 
& levy reported that adults did show the fallacy while curves for 
tenth-graders were only slightly suggestive*
Atkinson* Sommr, & Sherman (I960) reported it to occur in 
ternyear-old children during the first 200 and second 200- trials.
For adults* it occurred In 0? trials (Jarvik, 1951)* in 200 trials 
(Anderson, I960), and Edwards (1961) found a sli$*t effect in 300 
trials* The effect' then' seems to adapt out and disappear complete** 
ly with vary long series (Dorks, -19621 Edwards, 1961)* In general, 
curves become less steep with practice* (Micks, 1959J .'Boss & levy, 
1953), and this tendency is more rapid for conditions with stronger 
repetition tendencies built into the sequence (Anderson, 1961 j 
Dorks, 1963).
The above evidence clearly suggests that negative recency or 
the gambler* a fallacy is a much more pervasive phenomenon than 
Edwards (1956) believed* Its appearance and the shape of the re­
cency curves depend upon a number of variables * As has been mentioned, 
it is especially importardi in the li^it of various mathematical 
models which are based on the conditioning axiom* It must fee fr©ckoi*»* 
ed with* since- it obviously contradicts such models. It has often
IB
been neglected localise interest has centered in asymptotic behavior* 
Asymptotic response levels based on averages often night have ob* 
scared the fallacy (Darks, 1962)*
It is still not entirely clear where, ontogenetically, the 
gambler*s fallacy makes its first appearance. The purpose of the 
present study is to throw more light on this problem# the fallacy 
is clearly absent in animals, and if as Edwards (1956) pointed out, 
it is a highly intellectual response its beginnings must be sought 
somewhere during human cognitive development •
Although there has been no lack of studios concerned with proba­
bility learning in children (Berenbaum & Aderman, 1964; Bogarts,
1965; Das & Fhnda, 1963; Goldman & Denny, 1963; Gruen & Weir, 19641 
Jones k Liverant, 1960| Josh, Siegel, & Andrews, 1962} Kessick & 
Solley, 19571 Siegel k Andrews, 1962; Stevenson k Odom, 1964| Ste­
venson & Weir, 1959, 1963s Weir, 1962, 1963, etc,.) only a few also 
investigated the gambler’s fallacy (Atkinson, Sommer, & Sterwn,
1960$ Craig & %oro, 1963$ Boss'& levy, 195®)# The results are not 
clear-cut, taMle Hose & levy (195B) found some indication of the 
gambler’s fallacy at age 15 only, Atkinson, Sommer, & Sherman, (1960) 
as well as Craig & lyers (1963),. found the effect to occur around 
age ten. Differences may be due to gross methodological variations, 
Atkinson, Sommer, k Sherman and Craig & %ers used 200 trials, while 
Boss k Levy used only 40# Furthermore, Boss & Levy used a 50t50
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schedule in the majority of their When they did use a
60s40 schedule, it wa© generated in such a way m  to reduce long
runs* It i© doubtful whether a comparison between their 15-year* 
old g? and their adult §© la entirely valid* As has been pointed 
out (Craig & %ers* 1963) the latter received a $ 5.00 money reward 
and used IBM sheets to record their responses - in a 'group 'test* Hie 
former received no incentive and had no reference to previous re« 
sponges in an individually administered 'teat#
Ho clear definition m  to what essaotly constitutes a gambler fs 
fallacy emerged from these studies* A study for an adequate appraisal 
of sequential choice-behavior as it varies with age should includes
1* A sufficient number of trial©
2* A sufficient number of age levels where children can
be directly compared to- adults under the same conditions
3* An adequate schedule favoring the emergence of the
'gambler1© fallacy-
4* A clear definition as to what constitutes the gambler*© 
fallacy
The present study attempts to incorporate the above requirements.
The purpose of the present research was iwo**foXd* First* 
asymptotic behavior was to be determined for several age groups 
ranging from three*year*old nursery school children to college stud­
ents and to be compared to the finding© of other studies* On the 
basis of previously reviewed research it was expected that asymptotic 
behavior would differ with age*
ao
The second and primary purpose was to locate the first occurrence 
of the gamblerfs fallacy end to investigate Its subsequent develop** 
meet* As was discussed in the introduction* animals were never found 
to show negative recency, although monkeys develop somewhat m m  
sophisticated strategies than lower animals {Wilson* Oscar, - 6 Bitter** 
man* 1964)* Craig & !$rgre (1963) found some indication of .the fallacy 
for fourth-graders, but not for kindergarten children while Atkinson* 
Sommer* & Sherman (I960) found a clear recency effect for fifth** 
and sixth-graders# The first occurrence of the gambler*s fallacy* 
then* must be sought eemtetfhere during human cognitive development*
It ms hypothesised that the phenomenon should make its first appear** 
ance around the first and .second grades# Whether it is a highly 
■intellectual process as Edwards (1961) suggested or not* it certain­
ly presupposes some explicit or implicit awareness of the proba­
bilities involved in a task and an ability to take into account not 
only the previous ©vent but several events in a series* This ability 
is intimately tied up with counting, & process first made ©x$$leii 
at the beginning'Of formal schooling*
In order to accomplish the objectives stated above, §& ranging 
from nursery school children, kindergarten children and first-, 
second**, third-* and seventh-graders to college students were used#
All ,§p war© presented the m m  number of trials and Identical, series 
in m standard binary prediction took* Thus a direct comparison be-
tm m  §s differing widely in age could be undertaken* something not 
possible in other studies*
WSfflQD
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The apparatus was a black box the front panel of which was 12” 
high and 11” wide# Two red six volt lights were inounted on the panel 
6” apart# Under each, light was a button which 3 pressed to indicate 
his choice# The light# were controlled by £ operating switches* 
mounted on the back of the box* according to a predetermined sequence* 
The flashing of the lights indicated the correctness or incorrectness 
of §*s choice# In order to sustain attention and motivation in the 
younger children,, the front panel of the box was given the appearance 
of a -clown*a face by means- of colored tapes# The red ‘lights thus 
became the clown’s eyes#”
Stimulus Series
A series of 200 trials was generated with K  ^ » * 7 5 and /T^ m *25* 
The more frequently occurring event (the flashing of the right light) 
was designated as A, the less frequently occurring event (the flashing 
of the left light) as B« Thu© in the 200 trial series there were 150 
A events and 50 B events* The proportion 75*25 was chosen because it 
falls midway between a proportion of 50*50 and 100*0# It was felt 
that such a schedule would be conducive to eliciting the gambler’s 
fallacy# Whereas a random 50*50 schedule by its very nature usually 
favor© alternation, a 100*0 schedule tends to favor maximising* The
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latter results in a ’ceiling effect’ which in turn obscures the gambler’s 
fallacy* The above schedule was defined in terms of runs rather than 
single events* Huns m m  computed in regard to their expected frequency* 
The run distribution was as follows*
ububsa a*.§ggsit
1  run (s) of length 3  
9 ” ” 2
2 0  « « 1
10 runs of length 1
a « P 2
5 t* * 34 * * 4
3 « tt 5
3 it * 6
2 it « y
2 tt v s
1 it * f
1 tt ** 10
1 *t » H
These runs were randomly ordered with the restriction that a 75*25 
proportion was maintained within the first as well a© the second 1 0 0  
trials# {The actual schedule as presented to § is reproduced in ap~ 
pendix A*)
M>l§s£g
The §p ranged from nursery school children to college students 
and were divided into seven groups on the basis of school standings
1 * Hursery school children with an age range of three
years, three months to four years, 1 1 months and a mean 
age of four years, four months* (1^ 9 )
2* Kindergarten children with an age range of five years, 
no months to six years, two months and a mean age of 
five years, seven months* (IW2 9)
3# First-grade children with m  age range of six years,
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ftm  month©' to seven years, throe month© and a mean 
age of six years, 1 1  months# (K*€0 )
4# Second-grade children with an age rang© of seven years, 
six months to eight years, seven months and a mean age
of eight years, no souths#- ($*&Q)
5* Third-grade children with an age range of eight .year©, 
six months to ten year©, no months and a mean ag© of 
nine years, one south# (fH2G)
6 * Seventh-grade children with m  age range of 12 years, 
two months to 13 years, five months and a m m  age of 
1 2 years, 1 1 months* (fM2 0)
?# College atudents with an age range of 10 years, no months 
to 25 years, six month© and a mean age of 2 1 years, three 
month©* (IMO)
The nursery and kindergarten children were taken from a local 
private nursery school, and the elementary school children from York 
Elementary School at Yorktown, Virginia*^ The college student© were 
undergraduates attending the College of William and Mary* An attempt 
was made to maintain an approximately equal master of male© and females 
within each group*
Beocedurc
Each H was tested individually# He m s  seated at a table in front 
of the test box described above# The following instructions were 
read, to him:
"Look at the box before you# notice that there are two light© 
on the front panel, one on the right side, one on the left* Under
1* The author wishes to thank Mrs* Ann Smith and £$ro* Selma 
Lawson and their staff for their co-operation which made this study 
possible*
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each light there is a button, tour task is to predict which one of 
the two lights will m m  on# On each trial one and only on© of the 
two lights will come on* To indicate your choice push the button 
unto the light you think will come cm# Every time you are correct# 
the light over the button you have pushed will come on and you will 
receive e piece of candy. Do your best and try to b© correct as 
often as you can# **
The instructions had to be paraphrased for the younger §s until 
they clearly understood the task# A number of the youngest 3s were 
unable to handle the apparatus properly and seemed to push buttons 
indiscrimiimtely Just for tins pleasure of seeing the lights flashing* 
Therefor© the procedure was changed t o  the three^year-olds» g would 
hide a piece of candy in mm of her hands and ask § to point to the 
hand S thought the candy was in# This method proved very satisfactory, 
and confusion as to the task could be eliminated* Three four-year- 
old children and five fiv©**year*=old children were run for 1 0 0 trials 
with this method and t o  2 0 0  trials with the above n5©ntion@d apparatus* 
They responded in the same maimer regardless of which method was used* 
It was felt that the two methods were essentially equivalent. 11m 
Ss responded at their am speed, and the procedure was carried out 
in a rhythmic manner* For the nursery school and kindergarten child** 
ren the length of Interirial intervals was about six to ten seconds# 
for the older children and the college students it was approximateiy
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three to six seconds* A small candy reward was given for each correct 
response* The reward consisted of cossnercially available M & Kfs 
which had also been found effective and convenient by ether investi­
gators for children through a wide age range* (Bijou & Sturgess, 1959} 
This reinforcement was administered throughout all age groups* Ho 
difficulties w e  ^countered at any age level in administering the 
sequence* The task was mil within the ability of even the youngest 
S3 despite its length*
The average tine each S spent on the task ranged from about 15 
to 2 0  minutes*
RESULTS
iU tosmaftofcic behavior
The average A predictions for the first and second 100 trials 
are given in Table I* However, as Berks (1962) pointed out, individual 
differences In asymptotic behavior are usually obscured by averaging 
data# For example if one £ predicts A half of the time on a 72*25 
schedule while another predicts A 100^ of the time* the averaged, re** 
suits would be a probability-satch, a behavior characteristic of neither 
§* In order to make the data more meaningful, each group- was described, 
in terms of the individual £s#
Using a method described by Berks (1962) a III (probabllityM5atch** 
or) was defined m  any £ whose proportion of A predictions cm the 
second 1 0 0 trials was within £ 2  a) of the actual properties of that 
event# The SB was estimated byt
2r«i(» c r, . rr*; C O
where & » estimated SBf V', end /?! **the proportion of A and B# 
and N » number of trials# For 100 trials of a ?5l25 schedule 2 a)
** 0*66* Any St then, who predicted A from 6 6 to 84 times on the last 
100 trials was called a probabillty-*matcher (HI)* Any 5 predicting A 
05 times or above was called a maximizer (MAX)# In all groups at 
least some 3s predicted A less than 6 6 times* These S© wore called
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under-matchers (UM)« The actual number a® wall a© th© proportion of 
H*, MAX, and UM for each age group are given in 'table 2. The group© 
differed in proportion of m 9 MAX, and UM (X? ** 100.21, p ^ .001, df 
®»12). Figure 1 ©how© the proportions of Hi, MAX, and UM as a function 
of age. the proportion of MAX reaches a peak at th© nursery school 
level (.76), then drops sharply at the kindergarten level (.17), re­
gaining relatively constant thereafter# In contrast, th© proportion 
of m  is low (.1 0 ) at the nursery school level and kindergarten level, 
then increasing steadily until it reaches a maximum at th© seventh- 
grad© and college level {.65}• The UM curve begins low (.14), reaches 
a peak for the kindergarteners and then steadily decrease© up to 
college age (.15). the high proportion of UM in the kindergarten 
group is due to th© fact that 2 1  out of 2 9 children almost consist­
ently alternated A and B responses, which resulted in a total of 
approximately 50 A predictions oat of 100 possible A predictions. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that th© low proportion of Hi for th© 
nursery school children is due to the fact that most of them maximise, 
while th© kindergarten children essentially under-match. At the college 
level th® characteristic £ is the HI, with MAX and UM equally low.
B. The tmribQjer**. fallacy
Th© gambler1© fallacy or negative recency was described above 
as th© tendency of S to predict th© alternate event after a run of like 
events. Th© proportion of choice as a function of successive occur-
mr&mm of an event was calculated from §&f responses to sequences of 
six or more A events according to the method used fey Berks (1962). 
the schedule m s  generated in such a manner that there were five runs 
of six or more A events in- the first 100 trial®' and five runs of six 
or more A events in the second 100 trials* The predictions of A 
after it had occurred 0 # 1§ >*•* 5 times in a row were summated over 
§p in each group for the five sets of six or more successive A m m ts 
which occurred in the first and second 100 trials# Thus the samples 
consisted of 1 4 5 eases for the groups with B**C9 and 100 cases for the 
groups with 8N20 in which A followed B either 0* 1, 2, • 5 times
in. succession in the A rune that were six or longer * This is
n</
V  X  2 1  r^ ji- [>]
l*'« <f'='
wherei
i ** any individual § (i *» 1 * 2 , #•«, n^ )
J •* ary set of six successive occurrences of A (j » i9 2, 5)
k •* any number of successive occurrences of A within a sequence 
of six or mere such occurrences ( k «* 0 * X# 5*)
** number of A predictions following it successive occur* 
reneas of A for set j and subject i (n ^  0 * 1)
Tk «*total number of A predictions following k successive 
occurrences of A for all five sets and all Ss*
Figure 2 mmmarize© Tk as a function of k for all seven groups* The
gamblerfs fallacy is defined in the following maimer (Berks, 1962)s
Since the conditioning axiom predicts positive recency* l«e* states
that T|g will be a monotoxiically increasing function of k* any marked
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decrease in the function after n occurrences of A would be an Indication 
of negative recency. Equation 1 gives an estimate of 2 SB for Tk of 
1 0 * 4 3 for the groups where IW2 9- and of S# 6 6 for the groups where H *€Q#
A fjg of more than 2 SB less than any preceding Tfe will bo considered 
an indication of the gambler *s fallacy* Such a function then cannot 
bo described a© monotonically increasing* In Fig* 2 each subsequent 
Tjj. that is 2 SD less than the maximum is noted#
Figure 2  ©hows that the youngest group exhibits positive recency 
in both the first and second 100 trials* This is in line with the fact 
that this group also contains the highest proportion of maximizers, 
which is evident from Fig# 1* The kindergarten curve is markedly 
different in that a strong alternation tendency exists. It will be 
remembered that this group included a hi# proportion of UM as a re­
sult of alternation# This effect emrgse clearly in Fig.* 2* This 
function can neither be described a© monotonically increasing nor in 
term© of the gambler*s fallacy, Th© first-grade curve still shows 
some alternation tendencies during the first 1 0 0 trials thou# not 
as marked a© the kindergarten children* Toward© k **3 a positive 
recency effect seem© to begin* During th© second 100 trials, the curve 
exhibits positive recency. The second-grade children1© behavior is 
quite like that of the first graders with the exception that during 
the second 1 0 0 tidal© the curve begin© to decrease at k » 3* Although 
no \  is less than 2  SB below any preceding %, the difference between
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k - 3 muI k m 5 is 8 *0 0 , i*e# approaching 2  SD»f 8 *6 6 * the third** 
grade curve for the first 1 0 0 trials no longer choirs eny alternation 
tendencies $ It can be described as monotonlcally increasing* During 
the second 1 0 0 triale there is a sharp drop from k » 2  to k <* 3 with 
a difference of 13*00* Then the curve rises sharply again* A dear 
negative recency effect occurs for the seventh-graders for the second 
100 trials* The .curve rises steeply after k m 0, reaching a maximum 
height for k a l and k » 2* There Is a sharp decline between k *» 2 
and k « 3 with a difference of 12*00 which Is > 2 The curve
continues to fall up to k » 5* A dear gamblerfs fallacy then emerges 
at least tor the seventh-graders* The college .group also' eabiblts 
this effect as was esqpected* Perks (1962) had found a similar effect 
with college students for the last 1 0 0 trials of a ?5s2$ 2 5 0«trial 
schedule* and for the first 250 trials of a 1000-trial series*. The 
curves obtained fey Perks for various trial blocks of a XOPO-trial 
series are 'reproduced in the, lower right box of fig* 2 for the purpose 
of comparison with the present results*
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TABLE 1
Average No* of A responses over 
all groups
Group 1st 1 0 0 trials 2nd 1 0 0 trials
Nursery 80 87
Kindergarten 59 81
1 st grade 82 64
2 nd grade 6 4  6 8
3rd grade 6 0 6 5
7 th grade 6 8  70
College 6? 71
TABLE 2
Number and Broporfcion of I'M, PM, and CM 
over all groups
group mx
NUMBER
m  vm MAX
PROPORTION
m  cm
I&ireery 2 2 3 4 *76 .1 0 *13
Kindergarten 5 3 2 1 *17 . 1 0 *72
let grade § 3 1 0 *25 *25 *50
2 nd grad e 4 8 8 * 2 0 *40 *40
3 rd grade 3 1 0 7 .15 *50 *35
7th .grade 2 13 5 * 1 0 *65 *25
College 4 13 3 * 2 0 *6 $ *15
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Proportion A Suspenses as a function of K
100 Trials
k
2 nd 1 0 0 Trials
m m p 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3
Hwrmxy *70 #ao #83 * 8 6 .77 #87 *83 # 8 8 .07 *91
Kindergarten *67 *48 # 6 8 *59 .65 .54 .61 *56 .6 6 .53'
1st grade *56 *49 *72 .63 *72 *74 *58 .67 *76 .77
2 nd grade •57 .54 .72 •62 .76 *73 *57 *72. *76 #82
3 rd grade *59 *53 *53 *50 *60 *73 #52 *59 #82 •69
7 th grade *62 #62 #67 *72 #69 *69 .58 * 8 6 # 8 6 .74
College *70 •71 #73 .56 *59 #55 i .6 8 *79 *90 *81
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tmm  4
l¥oportl<m k responses m  a function of k 
wror trial blocks 
(Control group! Berks* 1942)
w m w  « wiwi'iwiiintiP-rMiiiw
k
Trials 0 1 2  3 k 5
1-250 .41 .67 *84 .75 .72 *73
2 5 1 - 5 0 0 *64 *78 .87 .78 .87 # 8 6
?51-1000 * 6 6 *85 .87 .83 •64 *62
mfmm  5
Proportion A responses as a function of k for 
1st* 2nd* and 3rd grades 
and
HUE, H4* and trn
1st 100 Trial® 2nd 100 Trials
k k
m a x ' MAX
Grade 0 1 z 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
1st *52 *64 *88 ♦as *96 *96 .84 M *96 1.00 .9 6 .96
2nd *65 * 6 0 .95 * 6 0 1 .0 0 *80 *55 .90 1 * 0 0 1 .0 0 ♦95 1 * 0 0
3rd * 6 0 .6 0 * 6 0 ♦73 .73 .80 .6? *93 1 .0 0 1 * 0 0 *87 .80
m m
1 st *52 *56 .76 *ao . 8 0 .92 .40 .76 *96 *64 *80 .96
2nd * 6 0 *65 .85 * 6 8 * 6 3 *78 .65 *80 .98 *93 ♦95 .75
3rd ♦56 *52 * 6 0 # 6 6 *70 .70 *50 . 6 0 .8 6 *78 *92 .90
m UM
1st *60 *38 * 6 2 *42 .6 6 .54 .54 *50 .56 .6 2 .58 .64
2 nd *50 *40 *48 *58 .73 *65 *50 .55 .42 *63 *55 .60
3 rd *63 ♦51 *40 '•40 *40 *74 ♦49 *43 .69 *43 .77
m 
I
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Fig. 1 Proportion §s MAX, PM, UK war a U  groups.
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Fig. 2 Proportion Tk as a function of k over ail groups, 
a — «ni»Tf<iwum Ti-J
b - subsequent Tk 2 SB below xmsdmm
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Pig. 3 lk as * function of k for MAX, Rj, and Oil 
for let, 2nd, and 3rd grades.
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DISCU3SI0N
A* Asymptotic behavior
As is indicated by the results, asymptotic behavior seems to 
change over age* The youngest group, with a ©©an age of four years, 
four months eahibits the highest average masher of A predictions for 
the last 100 trials* Twenty-two Ss out of 29 maximise* The kinder­
garten children under-match du© to a consistent alternation pattern 
of left and right responses. The tendency to alternate is still re­
latively strong for the first-graders. After that the number of HI 
increase® steadily, and apparently it is the characteristic asymptotic 
behavior for seventh-graders and college students, where 13 out of 2 0  
§8 probability-match« There is then evidence for different asymptotic 
behaviors for different age groups. The kindergarten children, and 
first-graders are significantly different from the nursery school child­
ren and both differ from the seventh-graders and college students, 
with second- and third^graders representing an intermediate stage whero 
no one type of asymptotic behavior stands out .
In contrast to the above findings, Messick and Solley (195?) 
found that three- and four-year-old children probability-matched for 
values of ^  1 from ,60 to #90 when no reward was given. They still 
matched for ‘ff' I ** ,75 with a candy reward for every correct response. 
Five-, seven-, and. eight-yoar-olda also matched without reward, but
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when such a reward m s  introduced five**, seven- and eigbt^year-olds 
in£pdmlsedf the effect being aoet pronounced for the oldest children* 
'Hie anthore argue that this interaction between final response level 
and age iray be ©plained in two m$® t
1« The results refleet a ^ learning to learn" phenomenon* 
The children "leam" to isaxiiaiae reward with age* 
Furthermore this potential to maximise is brought out 
when a reward is introduced#
2* The candy reward* s incentive value increase© with
chronological age and has sore effect on older children*
ftssaick & Solley (1957) used only seven children in all* All 
were of above average intelligence* In view of the ssmll N, the 
results are at .best tenuous* As m s  mentioned above, there were 
Bf in all seven groups of this study* It say well be that proba- 
bility~matchlng is correlated with I-3ental Age* but such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of the present paper and lacks evidence {Goldasan 
4 Benny, 19&3)* The second explanation also is difficult to sub­
stantiate* fbrhapa the reward, has its effect by m y  of Information 
in regard to the response rather than any reward value per ©e* For 
bright five-, seven- and ei#t-y©ar-olds this might result in 
jaasdmiaing, since they would be able to utilise the information* 
However, there is evidence that vary young children do maxiial©© 
when a reward consisting of candy or trinkets is contingent upon 
the response* In fact several studies showed the effect to be 
greater the younger the children. Jones & Liverant (I960) using
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7 0 * 3 0 end 90*10 schedules Cornel that nursery school children maxi­
mized while elementary school children aged nine to 1 1 essentially 
matched# Groups of children with a mean age of about five and in­
cluding nursery school as well as kindergarten children were found 
to maximise in studies by Goldman 4 ©enny (X9&3) and Andrews & Siegel 
(1962)♦ But the latter authors found matching in the same children 
when no reward whatsoever was given* this again is in agreement 
with the l&ssick k 3olXey (195?) results# Stevenson & Weir (1959) 
and Weir (1963) in a three-choice. situation* found three-year-olds 
to maximise with marbles m  reward* In agreement with the present 
research some of the results support maximizing as a characteristic 
response for very young children*
The dramatic drop in the number of A responses for the kinder** 
garien children is puzzling* As was mentioned above* this drop is 
due to a consistent left-eight alternation pattern regardless of the 
actual occurrence of events in the series* Similar behavior has 
-been noted by other investigators for the same age group (Bogarts# 
1965* Craig k l^ers* 1963* Bas & Banda# 1963* Shusterman, 1964)# 
While the other authors pointed out this fact as an interesting 
phenomenon* Das k I&nda interpreted such behavior as an inability 
to understand instructions and considered the data obtained from 
these 3s invalid*
the alternation tendency is still strong in the first-graders
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although loss systematic* The seventh-graders in this study' wore 
found to p*obabilityvmatch* Similar results were obtained by other, 
authors (Atkinson, Soaaaer, & Steran, 1959} Craig & layers, 1963} 
Goldman & Denny, 1963) with small token 'rewards or no reward and 
for various schedules* They seen to behave like adults* The 
college students also typically match, ■ a result supported by mary 
studies as pointed out in the introduction* berks (1 9 6 2), however, 
found that six out of ten |is in hi© control (no reward) group 
maximized over the last' 100 trials In a 250irial series* In a 
comparison it must be rauembered that his H was smaller (ten) 
than the II hare (2 0 ) and that the present instructions emphasised 
the desirability of being correct as often m  possible#
The second- and third-grader© consisted of mostly M  an UK*
On the average they just reached the lower limit of matching as 
defined# Comparable results were obtained by Braekblll, Kappy,
4b Starr (1959), Craig & %ers (1963), Goldman & benny (1963), 
and Jones & livorant (I960)* Stevenson & Weir (1959) and 
Weir (1963) in a three-choice situation, also found the number 
of A response© in this ago group to decrease in comparison with 
younger J5p*
How can these differences in asymptotic behavior be explained? 
Stevenson & Weir (1959) and Stevenson & Zigler (1957) argued that 
the choice ©f the most often rewarded event depends upon the level 
of success that § is willing to accept or expects* This in turn
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would depend upon previous experience* lime very young children 
or feebleminded children would be content with a partial solution 
end choose consistently the alternative paying off moot of the 
time* while older children search for a 100? solution# Such be** 
havior introduces variability# While marching for a f perfect* 
solution 5 would make less responses to the more often rewarded 
event ami thus in fact lower hie chances for reward in terms of 
the actual situation# Tide hypothesis was borne out* Older child­
ren Indeed employed more varied strategies while younger ones 
maximised* It is interesting to note that these authors also 
predicted and found that as reward increased# variability increased, 
resulting in even lower performance* The use of a three~ehoiee 
problem# however# might be particularly conducive to such behavior# 
A situation like this invite® strategies such as "Left#” saddle#*1 
"Right” or "Right#" "Middle,1* MXeftn# The apparatus consisted 
of a panel across which three buttons designated as t (left) M 
(Middle) R (Right) were mounted horizontally.
In contrast# Jones & liverant (I960) proposed the notion that 
older children have more experience with reward probabilities of 
less than 1 * 0 0 and thus will come to match while young children 
wiH stay with the more promiaieing alternative hoping it will 
pay off all of the time# These factors may play a role In proba-
45
bility lemming, but perhaps it is more fruitful to describe the 
behavior of young children in 3*R terms {Weir* 1963)# They act 
as thou#) they become conditioned to the fgood* side and after a 
short time choose that side consistently# i#e# they employ a 
w±n~stay strategy# The effect then becomes so overriding that 
incorrect responses have little effect# Weir (1963) compared their 
maximizing behavior with that of 18*year~olda* These Ss also 
maximized in the same task# but they reached a hi#* response level 
much later than the thr ee^ear-olds * They maxisdsed only after 
having tried many strategies and found that there was no perfect 
solution in a problem solving sense* As jja grow older they seem 
to enter the task with many hypotheses which prevent them from 
adopting a clear-cut strategy frm the beginning* It is- of i**- 
barest that in the present study half of the three-year-olds 
could not identify the * correct* side when asked by g# despite the 
fact that they were consistently responding to it* Ibis might be 
taken as more evidence for conditioning in S-R terms.
The curious alternation behavior of the five-year-olds is 
even more difficult to explain# In contrast to the three-year- 
olds, all these children could identify the correct side without 
hesitation after the completion of the task# They knew they would 
have gotten more candy by choosing A more often and yet did not 
do so# Although this behavior was also found by other invest!-*
gators as mentioned above, they gave no adequate explanation.
These jSe cling to this response pattern in. an autistic manner, 
oblivious of the actual schedule* Perhaps it is a naanifestation 
of PiagetTs "egocentric speech*” There is evidence that this 
stereotyped behavior night be influenced by making 1? x raore 
extreme (Craig 4 l^ers, 1963) or by increasing the reward (Siegel 
& Andrews, 1963) for this age group*
In view of the evidence cited above and the results of this re* 
search it can be concluded that the most «mature’ approach to freba* 
bility tasks 1© profeability-faatching, at least under appropriate con* 
ditions • The gradual increase of the number of M  over age supports 
this view#
B* yhggambler’B ftOIas?
The hypothesis that the gambler^s fallacy should appear in the 
first or second grades was not borne out# The fallacy, as defined 
in the result section, Is not clearly evident before the seventh* 
grade level# The third^graders do- not exhibit it* But neither can. 
the sharp 'drop -from' k ** 2 be k 3 in the second 100 trials for this 
group be described by a monotonieally 'increasing .function* It Is 
•safe to assume that the fallacy begins to make its appearance around 
the fourth ‘grade level under the appropriate conditions. This aesumpfc* 
ion is substantiated by the results obtained by Craig & %ers (1963)*
A?
their fourth-graders shewed the fallacy after the fifth A event for 
a 80*20 schedule but net for ft 60*40 schedule* * At 'the fifths and 
sixth-grade level# the effect crystallises and. becomes more Indspend* 
eat of the schedule as such* Atkinson* Somner, & Sterraan (I960) found 
that children at this age showed a clear negative recency effect for 
both 50t50 and 75*25 schedules and varying amounts of reinforcements 
for A and B events* Seventh-gradera. exhibited the fallacy during the 
second 100 trials in the present study and ei$vth~graders showed the 
effect over a total of 200 trials and for 60*40 as well as 80*20 
schedules (Craig & Jurors# 1963)*
the run curves for the nursery school children show a clear 
positive recency effect in this study such as is found also in animals# 
the curves start out very hi^h from the beginning* which is in line 
with their frenouaeed tendency to msudmize ©specially daring the last 
100 trials* The alternation in kindergarteners discussed above Is 
again strikingly reflected in their recency curves and persists through 
all of the 200 trials* Craig & i^ers (1963) found a comparable effect 
if less pronounced# in kindergarten children for a 60*40 schedule* 
Shusierman (1964) also obtained alternation for a short-run 50*50 
schedule for five-year-olds* The first* and second-graders again 
show positive recency which suggests that something important happens 
at the kindergarten level* tifhy kindergarteners should alternate
40
irrespective of the schedule is difficult to explain.
The behavior of the third-grade children is of special interest 
since they represent an intermediate stage in regard to the gambler’s 
fallacy# As was pointed out* fourth-graders do show negative recency 
tinder certain conditions while younger children either alternate or 
show positive recency* Of particular interest is the curve for the 
second 100 trials* There is a sharp initial rise followed by a sharp 
drop which is ^  2 SB at k - 3 with a subsequent recovery* Berhaps 
one might consider this an ’incipient’ fallacy* given up soon for 
positive recency* Furthermore the first sharp drop occurs at k » 3, 
i«e# at the same position where the negative effect begins for the 
seventh-graders and the college students* It is also at this stage 
that children are concerned explicitly with various strategies* Upon 
questioning, many of these children told g that they were trying to 
find a pattern or attempted to ’get that left (less frequent event) 
one’* While the younger children accepted the task unquestioningly, 
the third- and seventh-graders as well as the college students found 
the task extremely unstructured and frustrating* They tried to reduce 
ambiguity fey attempting to find scsm pattern which might fit the sche­
dule* Although no statistical evaluation was undertaken, it was ob­
served that many thirds and seventh-graders and students were trying 
to catch the "left” event, especially at the beginning of the task#
mBrackbill, Kappy & Starr (I960) noted a similar tendency in their 
seconds and third-graders. This strategy accounts for the behavior 
of Jgs designated as OM in these groups* The fiat curve© for the first 
100 trials for the third** and seventh-graders reflect this tendency*
It is then replaced by the gambler*© fallacy by the seventh-graders 
and perhaps to some extent by the third-gradere, which In view of the 
actual sequence of ©vents would be a.store reasonable strategy*
It was felt that separate recency curves for MAX# M 9 and IB! 
for the first three grades might throw seas© additional light upon 
processes underlying the development of the fallacy* Perhaps the three 
type© of response strategies reflect difference© in terms of negative 
recency* Because of the ©mall H of these subgroups any discussion of 
the underlying response processes must be highly speculative*
Figure 3 represent© the recency curves for MAX, Bt, and tIM for 
the first-, seconds and third-grades* While the first-grade MAX clear­
ly maximize for the first as well as second 100 trial©, the second- 
and third-grade MAX seem to do so after having tried various strategies* 
With Increasing age a negative recency effect seems to develop# How­
ever the third-grade MAX group is based on an N of only three, and 
the effect might be an artifact* The PM curves over age for the 
second 100 trial© especially again ©how a tendency toward negative 
recency. The OH curves suggest that undermatching results mainly from
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alternation tendencies and the attempt to fget the left one*, The 
latter effect is particularly weH reflected in the first 100 trials 
for the thiid^gradere*
One might venture to say that maximizing in the present situation 
is the more primitive response with a tendency toward negative recency 
slowly appearing. In general* matching is the more mature approach 
with all M  group© ©adhibiting the fallacy- earlier than the I-3&& groups, 
USf are characterised by either stereotyped alternation or the willing* 
ness to risk ’irrational* strategies resulting In reduced choice of 
the A event.
Comparison of these recency curve© strongly points toward at 
least three underlying processes which met he taken into account? 
alternation* positive recency* and the attempt to catch the left event* 
It may fee that a fusion of these tendencies resulting from averaging 
data obscures the fallacy at earlier ages, A more intensive study of 
larger ©roup© of §p employing different strategies would be of great 
help, It may be found that the fallacy is highly correlated with 
probability'^ natching, at least at earlier ages,
A final comparison might throw mm® light upon difference® In 
.recency curves over age*. A look at the lower right hand box of Fig.*
2 surest© certain analogies between the data obtained by Berks (1962) 
for college student© over a 1000*trial series and the present data.
It is emphasized that the following comparisons must remain purely
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descriptive* However, the similarities are compelling* The,curve 
for the first 250 trials shows the typical gambler’s fallacy as was 
found here for the seventh-graders and the college students* The 
maxima occur at k » 2 for all three curves* The curve for trials 
251-500 shows a weak negative recency effect with quick recovery very 
much like the third-grade curve for the second 100 trials. The curve 
for' trials 751-1000 is strikingly similar to the second 100 trial 
curve for the nursery school children. Could it be that nursery 
school children ’get to the point’ much faster than older children 
.and adults? This would add evidence to the notion that young children 
become conditioned in tern® and are not hampered by initial hypo­
theses and resulting strategies as Weir (1943) proposed* In other 
words,, adults ’give up’ when their strategies fail and revert to an 
earlier mode of responding, namely- m&a&adelng and positive recency* 
Perhaps third-' and fourth-grade children try various strategies one 
of which is reflected by a half-hearted fallacy and then go back to 
maximizing earlier than do adults* Adults first show the fallacy 
which then is reduced in the intermediate trials* Thus the curves 
for trials 251-500 for adults and second 100 trials for third-graders 
look quite similar although arrived at in different ways*
The gambler’s fallacy then clearly is a response process well 
within the ability of seventh-grade children at least, negative evidence
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to the contrary (Ross & Levy, 1958)* It emerges m  a maturations!
phenomenon rather than one correlated with intelligence as are the 
detection of sequential dependencies in general (Shusterman, 1964) *
Its occurrence implies the ability to pay attention to event sequences 
in the schedule Independent from the response® actually made by the 
S* (Happy & Starr, 1960$ Craig & layers* 1963$ Shusterman, 1964)*
This ability has been found to increase with age* It permits the $ 
to take into account more than one previous response and one previous 
event* a capacity absolutely essential for the gambler1 s fallacy to 
occur.
AM OVBHftBf
In.mmmrr then, this studY demonstrated that even three-year- 
old children can reload effectively to a probabilistic situation*
At first glance these findings contradict Piaget’s belief that child** 
ren have no clear notion of probability before the ages of seven or 
eight* The question remains m  to Whether young children really re** 
spond in terras of probabilities or merely emit conditioned responses* 
The results of this study suggest that the latter probably is the case* 
Young Ss apparently respond to single events or short runs rather 
than to a probabilistic situation as a whole* It raust be .conceded, 
then* that Piaget might have been correct in denying young children 
a true concept of probability (Flavell, 1963)* The type of task 
Piaget used in testing children’s understanding of probabilities and 
proportions were ingenuous and tapped such concepts directly* Un- 
fortunately the heavy reliance upon verbal, skills makes them difficult 
to employ with young children as was pointed out by other authors, 
(Yost, Siegel, & Andrews I960)* It further showed that there are 
important differences in strategies by various age groups in a proba­
bility learning, task, a fact substantiated by other studies* Again it 
.was found that a two-choice probability learning task usually turns 
out to be much, more complex than was believed originally# Its ap­
parent simplicity is deceptive* As Derk® (1962) emphasised, the
m.
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final response level reflects only one aspect of the many processes 
operative* It is important for lemming and information theories to 
identify various strategies obscured by averaging data* the gambler*s 
fallacy is only on© such strategy# The findings in this research, 
gest that other equally important processes occur which change over 
age and which are in no way obvious from asymptotic response levels# 
thorough investigation should reveal further interesting complexities* 
Steps in this direction have already been undertaken by several 
authors who attempted a fino«*grain analysis of response patterns 
such as alternation (Bogarts, 1965), rate of response curves for 
different ages (Craig & lyers, 1963, Weir, 1963), the effects of 
incorrect responses (Craig & %ers, 1963), and changing conditional 
probabilities with event proportions remaining the same (Shustenmn, 
1964)*
APfBHBlCES
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INDIVIDUAL DATA
NUMBER OP A RESPONSES OVER SECOND 10OTRIALS 
FOR 8URSEBE A ®  KINDERGARTEN CHILDREN
§ Nursery Kindergarten i Hnrsery Kindergarten
1 100 58 16 100 51
z. 100 61 17 84 49
3 100 78 18 100 50
4 XOO 62 19 100 52
5 100 34 20 82 54
6 99 72 21 86 52
7 100 52 22 100 52
a 100 51 23 85 80
9 50 53 24 78 100
10 4 50 25 63 100
u 43 50 26 100 97
12 100 50 27 100 100
13 100 50 28 92 96
14 88 50 29 100 48
15 100 50
MOTIOJAL BATA
NUMBER OF A RESPONSES OVER SECOND 100TRIALS 
FOR AIX OTHER GROUPS
& 1st 2nd 3rd 7th CoU*
I 83 52 53 57 85
2 93 60 78 69 90
3 80 80 52 55 77
4 55 82 62 61 74
5 74 70 72 55 80
6 62 58 84 6? 76
7 58 79 55 88 84
8 50 46 59 79 76
9 92 81 71 84 76
XO 50 49 76 66 75
11 65 74 42 81 58
12 50 84 80 73 58
13 84 99 71 85 76
*  * 14 94 87 63 83 61
15 50 85 91 83 69
16 95 90 86 72 86
17 m 47 76 70 74
18 69 81 79 71 73
19 60 64 92 78 76
20 50 53 67 78 76
1a
3
4
5
6
7
a
9
10
XL
12
13
14
15
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mnxnmxL m m  
(m m sB n r  s c h o o l )
NUMBES Of 4 HESra«S AS 4 FtltfCTXON CP *
1st 100 Trial© 
k
2nd 100 Trial© 
k
■0 , 1 2 - rt-n&rr-™- 0 1 „ 3 .. A
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
1 5 5 5 4 5 S 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 S
4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 S
1 4 1 4 0 5 1 4 X* 4 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 1 a a 4 1 3 1 1
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
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5
5
5
5
5
§
5
5
5
5
S
5
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individual m m  
(mnmm school)
number m  a h e s k ^ s  a s  a function or &
1st 100 Hri61» 2nd 100 Trials
^ ____ *— i___ ..a.,, a__— a____j. 2  j___
2 2 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
4 3 4 4  5 4 3 4 4 5 4
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
1 4 4 3 4 3  2 5 5 5 5
4 3 4  5 4 5  4 3 4 4 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
3 5 5 5 4 4  4 5 4 5 5
4 3 5 4 5 4  3 2 5 5 5
5 4 4 5 5 5  3 4 3 4 4
5 5 5  5 5 5  5 5 5 5 5
5 3 5 3 5 3  5 5 5 5 5
0 4 4 5 4 4  3 5 5 5 5
4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
(I
3
3
2
4
5
4
a
3
3
2
3
a
3
2
2
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INDIVIDUAL DATA 
(KltOTRaABOT)
NUMBER OF A IESFGWS AS A FUNCTION CF k
1st 100 trials
. k   .
.1, 2 ,3m ,n....4... . ,, 9
2 .3 a 4 i
4 4 5 3 4
2 3 3 3 3
2 4 4 4 .3
1 0 0 0 0
3 3 4 a 4
3 1 4 a 4
2 3 3 a 3
2 3 3 a 1
3 2 3 i 4
0 5 0 5 0
3 2 3 3 3
a 3 a 3 3
3 3 3 a 3
3 a 3 3 l
2nd 100 trials
0 A „- r* T-.3 .
a 3 5 0 5
a 4 3 3 4
0 4 5 5 3
i 4 a 1 4
4 1 0 2 0
2 2 3 1 5
5 1 3 a 3
3 a 3 3 2
3 2 a 3 3
4 1 4 1 A
4 1 4 1 4
A X 4 I 4
1 4 1 4 1
A 1 4 1 4
4 1 4 1 4
JL
i
2
1
3
3
a
5
4
5
5
5
5
5
2
mxmXWO. DATA 
(IC3OTB2GABM)
rnrnm of a heskbses as a function or u
1st 100 Trials 2nd 100 Trials
k   . ..   k
,1. , 2 .. , i - . 5nrr~ . 0 ,r...1....... a I-,,:, -4.
0 5 0 5 O 3 2 3 2 4
2 3 2 3 1 1 4 i 2 3
0 5 0 3 0 4 1 4 1 4
3 2 4 1 4 4 a 3 2 3
0 5 0 5 0 4 2 3 2 3
a 3 3 '2 4 3 3 2 3 3
3 2 3 2 3 0 3 0 5 0
0 5 3 3 a 3 3 5 4 5
5 5 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 5 4 5 3 5 3 5 5
4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
A 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 5 5
3 2 3 3 2 2 a 3 2 3
&4
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
5
O
1
a
5
2
3
2
2
4
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INDIVIDUAL m m  
( H O T  GRflHE)
NUMBER CF 4 H3SSP0MS AS A T O O T  OF k
let- 100 Trials 2nd 100 Trials
I# if
2 ? 4 --JL__ 0 1 2 3 .■..~A ....- ........a
1 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4
3 5 3 5 A 4 4 5 5 3 5
4 5 4 3 5 1 5 5 4 5 5
2 3 2 3 2 1 3 3 4 2 5
2 3 5 3 5 1 4 4 5 4 5
2 3 1 5 4 3 2 4 3 4 3
3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 4
0 3 0 3 0 A 1 4 1 4 1
3 4 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 5
4 1 4 1 A 4 1 4 1 4 1
0 4 2 A 3 3 2 3 5 3 4
5 0 5 0 5 1 4 1 4 1 4
4 2 3 3 3 1 4 5 4 5 5
3 5 4 5 5 3 4 4 5 3 4
0 5 0 3 0 4 1 4 2 4 1
2 4 5 3 5 5 3 S 5 5 5
5 4 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 3
3 4 4 3 4 2 3 5 5 a 4
2 3 2 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 5
1 4 3 3 2 1 4 1 4 1 4
i2
4
4
5
2
2
3
4
5
2
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
3
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xminwAi m m  
(smm> grade) 
rnwrn cp 4 responses 4a a nmcnoR or k
1st 100 Trials
. . _ k . .
1 .. 2 . m 3 hi r Ami,, I
3 2 4 3 4
2 2 4 4 4
2 4 3 4 3
4 3 4 3 4
3 4 3 2 4
0 2 2 4 2
3 4 3 4 5
4 3 3 4 4
2 5 4 3 4
3 2 ■a 2 4
3 4 2 1 I
5 5 4 5 5
5 5 a 5 5
A 4 5 5 5
1 5 3 5 4
2 5 2' 5 2
0 4 2 3 4
4 5 4 3 5
3 2 3 4 3
X 2 3 5 1
<wiCI 1 W  iTlBiS 
k
„■  ^■ 2
2 3 3 3 2
2 3 2 3 3
A 4 5 4 5
1 5 5 5 5
3 2 5 4 5
3 0 4 3 3
A 4 5 5 5
1 3 2 2 3
2 3 5 5 1
2 3 2 3 3
3 4 5 4 5
A 5 5 5 5
4 5 5 5 5
2 5 5 5
3 3 5 5 4
2 5 5 5 5
X 4 2 3 2
5 % 4 5 3
4 2 2 A 2
3 4 0 4 4
&
A
4
X
4
3
4
4
5
4
3
2
3
5
a
5
a
5
5
5
5
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INDIVIDUAL DATA 
(THIRD GRADE)
NUMBER GT A HESOTSES AS A FUNCTION GF k
1st 100 Trials
a. ■3 -.,-M
a 2 3 3 3
3 3 2 3 3
.3 1 3 I 4
4 0 X a 4
3 3 3 a A
0 3 4 5 a
a a 1* 3 5
4 4 X X 5
3 4 4 a 3
1 1 4 3 4
X a 2 0 3
4 3 a 4 4
3 a 3 A 4
a 3 3 3 2
a .2 .5 .3 .3
4 3 .1 4 2
X a 3 4 4
a 5 4 4 4
3 4 5 4 5
a 4 a 4 3
2nd 100 Trial® 
k
q 1 2 .r. 4
a 2 4
r
a 4
2 3 5 4 5
4 X 2 2 4
3 3 A 2 4
a 3 5 4 3
4 2 5 3 5
3 X 4 3 4
a X 5 3 3
4 3 3 3 5
4 3 3 4 5
2 3 X a 3
2 4 A 4 5
a 4 3 5 .5
X 4 4 X 5
.4 5 5 5 5
4 A 5 5 3
I 2 5 5 5
1 4 5 3 5
2 5 5 5 5
3 a 5 2 3
1
a
4
2
3
3
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
5
4
0
0
4
1
5
3
b t o i v x i h j a l  m m
(SEVENTH GRADE)
BUKHER OF 4 RESPONSES AS A FUNCTION OF k
l«t 100 Trials
. k......
-JL 2 Imi 4 m r
4 2 2 3 4
4 4 1 4 5
0 4 5 3 2
3 1 3 3 3
3 1 3 3 3
1 3 3 2 3
5 3 5 5 3
3 5 3 3 A
1 1 4 0 3
1 4 a 3 4
5 3 5 4 5
4 4 4 5 4
4 4 3 3 3
3 4 4 4 4
A 2 3 4 3
2 4 4 5 4
3 4 3 5 3
5 5 3 3 3
3 5 3 2 3
4 4 5 3 3
2nd 100 Trial© 
k
P ",, \ , a. .3 , „„ "4
3 3 4 2 3
5 5 5 0 a
4 3 1 4 3
1 3 4 3 3
1 3 4 3 3
4 4 4 3 1
5 5 5 5 3
A 5 5 3 A
2 5 3 2 3
1 4 5 5 4
4 4 4 4 5
4 4 4 "4 3
3 5 5 5 4
4 5 5 5 2
5 5 5 4 4
1 3 5 4 3
3 4 4 5 2
2 5 5 5 3
1 4 4 4 3
1 5 5 4 4
.69
vsommkL bata
(COtiEGE)
NUMBER OP A RESPONSES AS A FUHCTIQS OP k 
1st 100 Trials 2nd 100 Trials
         ,.K..
S MII 0 . 1, 2 ■^-r-SUr■TirA'h. -r r ^ . T ,.„ ... 1 2 o .........5.
1 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 4 3
2 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 3
3 3 2 3 2 3 2 5 5 5 4 0 4
4 4 4 3 3 2 4 2 4 5 5 a 2
5 2 3 5 3 2 4 3 4 5 5 3 a
6 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 5
7 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3
B 1 4 3 3 5 4 3 4 5 5 4 2
9 5 5 5 4 5- 3 2 4 4 4 2 4
10 4 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 5 4 3, X
XL 3 3 3 1 4 2 X 3 4 3 2 2
12 1 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 4 5 3
33 3 3 4 3 2 2 5 2 3 4 a 4
14 2 3 3 1 0 1 4 4 4 3 4 2
15 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 .5 5 5 5 2
16 4 5 4 2 3 2 4 5 5 3 2 3
17 5 5 4 3 3 4 5 3 4 3 4 a
IB 3 2 4 3 3 0 3 4 5 4 4 3
19 4 4 4 3 a 4 3 4 5 5 5 5
20 5 5 4 2 0 0 4 5 5 4 4 2
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